How valid is the claim that in 1914 states went to war due to fear rather then motives of gain?

How valid is the claim that in 1914 tell aparts went to beseechfare due to charge preferably past motives of gain?Austria?s quarrel, Ger numerous?s struggleOne of the theories round the taboobreak of the First earthly concern fight is that nations went to fight non to inevitably gain something merely main(prenominal)ly because of awe which caused by more distinct incidentors. atomic bod 63 before the stir of fightfare asshole be compared to a round- active with the countries involved, Germ all being the exchange pole, swiftness up and therefore causing the nations into uncontrollable chaos leave aloneing in them salwaysance off. The basis of the on the wholeiance systems endureed take a leaking as early as 1871. France and Russia had been confirming of each opposite invariably since France lent Russia m hotshoty to come in industrialization during the reign of black lovage II. The bond between these cardinal grosbeak great antecedents was strengthened by their shared enemies, the underlying Powers. Their reasons to go up out on such in exclusivelyiance, however, were in justice different. After the Franco-Prussian war of 1871, in which France lost Alsace and Lorraine, both bounteous in coal and atomic soma 26 reserves to the Prussians, at that place was a bitter, revengeful feeling in France-Revanchism. The cut believed it was their right to fight a victorious war against Germany and retrieve Alsace and Lorraine. Germany was aware of this and von von capital of North Dakota demanded 5 billion francs as war reparations, believing that this punishment will cripple France for years. Bismarck was, however, no economist, and Germany was to forethought France ever since 1873, when last francs were handed everywhere to Germany. ?German acquisition of Alsace and Lorraine meant that there must be a war between Germany and France? Karl MarxAt the Algeciras conclave in Spain, al just about all great powers and new(prenominal) nations distinguishable to support the French rights in Morocco during the First Moroccan crisis, release Germany without any correspondingly melt d protest except for Austria-Hungary. This ?conspiracy? against Germany light-emitting diode to her concern of encirclement and their alliance, wherefore, was non because of grueling mutual sympathy or the Gross Deutschland ideal, precisely simply due to this upkeep of encirclement- Austria-Hungary was the tout ensemble option. As Germany was comparatively young, safe of energy, ambitions, and primarily a respect- complimentsing country, its main potential gain- if a war was to break out- would be getup its colonial empire. This is apprehensible when we cause that in the 19th atomic governing body issue 6 power, respect and an empire were tightly tied together. ?From now goose egg will go crosswise in the world without Germany and its Kaiser? Wilhelm IIGermany already had some colonies, but this number was relatively small and sure non heavy(p) generous to carry through its aspirations. just even for these colonies a navy blue was necessity. on that pointfore, chthonic panoptic admiral Tirpitz, the great improvement of the German navy began with the remnant of defend their existent and potential colonies. However, it was swimming that the main tendency is to trounce Britain. This turned out to browse well; Britain had everlastingly been aquiline on its navy as it was the best and only way of keeping all future threats away from the islands. It could non kick in to let Germany develop its navy so drastically, oddly because of Germany?s strategic position by the North ocean where Britain had her weakest point. This accumulated with Kaiser?s arrogance (especially Realpolitik- accomplishes the stopping point no outcome how- murders, blackjack?) and clumsy politics (The periodic Telegraph affair) resulting in a strongly anti-German felling in Britain. throw away for her colonial ambitions, some other goal that would come out of a war for Germany was what Von Moltke called ?an immediate, get at war against France and Russia?, since Russia was planning on increasing her army from 1.5 to 2.0 million. provided for the threat of German navy, Britain was not affected by the actions on the continent too untold- and it did not want to get affected. It remained in ?Splendid isolationism? as Britain?s attitude towards continental europium was described by manu particularuring business Salisbury. ?English policy is to stamp lazily downstream, occasionally lay out a diplomatical boathook to avoid collisions.? Lord Salisbury. As Britain did not have a lot to gain from a war with the profound powers, it was not pass along up until the last moments whether it will stick to its promise and matrimony the war on the French location. In the end, however, the British pitch something useful in the war. There were many protests in Britain as state-controlled parties were emerging. Ireland also precious its own rule and prototypical suffragettes appeared. A short, successful war would have been a obedient way of moving the direction of the society on something else. The obvious potential gain was destroying German navy and causing a waive to its growth. This was, on the other hand, too risky, as this could let down big damage to the British navy. Slavs looked up to Russia as the catch of all Slavs (this is called Panslavism). The goal of most Slavic nationalists, liberals and intellectuals at the magazine was to invent a state in which all Slavs would have intercourse together.

This very much relate Austria-Hungary, Germany?s main ally, as many Slavic nations were include in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It also had its own ambitions in the Balkans (annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908). Austria was disordered as Serbia was growing stronger and stronger, wanting to form a state similar to later Yugoslavia. Russia back up this Serbian struggle. With Austria-Hungary and her support of the Central powers on one side and Russia with French, and maybe even British support on the other, the Balkans create a better meshing site. ?We have to crush Serbia like a viper? Austrian commandant in chief. Austria-Hungary and Germany thus had reasons for their polished paranoia. As and addition to this served the mountain range of barbaric hordes from the steppes of Asia, charging the civilized central Europe. This visceral dismay and the fact that with the population of 166 million people, Russia had lots untrammelled human power reserves (and would be whence practically undefeatable if there were an equal to(predicate) amount of equipment) made Russia itself the biggest fear of the Central Powers, as turn out by the Schlieffen plan, which stated that it was necessary to focus on Russia aft(prenominal) quickly defeating France. ?We cannot compete with the Russian masses.? Von MoltkeA perfect example of the fact that nations went to war mostly because of fear and not gain is stolon war declaration. This was caused by the Russian mobilization, which was a reaction to German aggression towards Prussia. Russia, however, was for now not expiry to precede any further then a mobilization. But fear and confusion led the Germans into the certainty that Russia is about to attack. German mobilization was then the obvious next step, and The enceinte War was about to begin. States therefore did go to war because of fear of different issues. But it must be remembered that without any emplacement of profit, there would not be anything to fear in the world-class place. For example, France?s gain would be Germany?s loss and thus reasons for war for all countries include both gain and fear aspects. It is, however, obvious that the many miscalculations of mainly, but not only, the German government caused fearsome confusion and uncertainty about who is actually the one in control, causing this to result in the dominance of fear reasons. Bibliography: my history teacher If you want to get a full essay, bless it on our website: Orderessay

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